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## RECENT CASES.

**ATTORNEY AND CLIENT—WITHDRAWAL OF ATTORNEY PENDING SUIT—***LALANCE & GROSJEAN MFG. CO. v. HABEMAN MFG. CO.*, 93 F. R. 197.—An attorney who in good faith withdraws from a case, believing that the litigation is ended, will not in case of a continuance be enjoined from accepting a retainer from parties having an adverse interest or from disclosing information derived from such client while acting in his professional capacity.

**BANKS AND BANKING—APPLICATION OF DEPOSITS—***HODGIN v. PEOPLE'S NATIONAL BANK*, 32 S. E. (N. C.) 887.—A firm was indebted to a bank, and one of the partners was personally indebted. The latter died and the surviving partner collected the firm's assets and deposited them in the bank. *Held*, that the bank could apply these moneys to the firm's debts and to the personal debt. *Furches and Douglas, J. J.*, dissenting on the ground that the surviving partner alone had the necessary control over the deposits to apply them to the firm debts.

**BANKRUPTCY—PREFERENCES—***IN RE LITTLE RIVER LUMBER CO.*, 92 F. R. 585.—A solvent corporation pledged and delivered to some of its stockholders policies of insurance on its property (making policy first payable to such stockholders as their interests may appear) as collateral security for loans made to corporation to enable it to enlarge its business. Policies were renewed at a time when corporation was insolvent and within four months before filing a petition in bankruptcy. Loss occurred before adjudication in bankruptcy, and proceeds of policies paid to such stockholders. *Held*, that same did not constitute a preference, and that such stockholders could not be required to surrender the amount so received, and also that they may prove their claims against the corporation for any balance due them.

**CABLE CARS—CARRIERS—PASSENGERS—STANDING ON PLATFORM—***N. CHICAGO ST. R. CO. v. BAUR*, 53 N. E. (Ill.) 568.—It is not contributory negligence, per se, for passengers to ride on a cable car on rear platform, where others do it without objection, and there is no rule against so doing.

**CARRIERS—INJURY IN ALIGHTING FROM TRAIN—NEGLIGENCE—EVIDENCE—***AGUHO v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. CO.* 43, Atl. Rep. 63 (R. I.).—In an action for injuries received in alighting from a train at a station at night, under an allegation that the station was not properly lighted at the time. *Held*, that the court did not err in excluding testimony that it was not lighted at times before and after the injury, for such testimony is not competent.

**CARRIERS—INJURY TO PASSENGERS—CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE—***GARVEN v. MACLEOD*, 92 F. R. 846.—In going to or leaving a train at a station, passengers were invited to cross an intervening track. *Held*, that the fact that a passenger did not stop to look and listen for an approaching train before crossing such track did not constitute contributory negligence on his part.

**DAMAGES—MEASURE OF—DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT—***TEXAS & P. RY. CO. v. WILDER ET AL.*, 92 F. R. 95.—Statutes of Texas provide that parents may recover full pecuniary compensation for death of a minor child caused by the